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[Crim. No. 7466.

In Bank.

June 29, 1965.J

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL
ALLEN ROBERTS, Defendant and Appellant.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MAE BLANCHE
COLEMAN, Defendant and Respondent.
[Consolidated Appeals.]
[la, Ib] Criminal Law-New Trial-Determination.-The trial
court did not err in granting defendant's motion for a new
trial where incriminating statements were elicited from her
and from her codefendant by officers, after an investigation for
murder focused on defendants who were in police custody,
through interrogations that lent themselves to eliciting incriminating statements, which were used at the trial.
[2] Id.-Appeal-Reserving Questions-Evidence--Admissions.Defendants' failure to object to the admission of their statements obtained without advising them of their rights to counsel and to remain silent does not preclude their raising the
question on appeal where their case was tried before the decisions were rendered establishing that such statements are
inadmissible.
[3] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel: Waiver.-The right
to counsel during interrogation does not turn on a request,
and a waiver of that right and of the right to remain silent
cannot be presumed.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 146 et seq., 165; Am.Jur.,
Criminal Law (1st ed §§ 167 et seq., 173).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 969; [2] Criminal
Law, § 1080(2); [3] Criminal Law, §§ 107,110; (4) Criminal Law,
§ 448; [5] Criminal Law, §§ 628(1), 852; [6] Criminal Law,
§ 1404(17).
*Retired Associate JusticE' of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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[4] Id.-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Officers.-Before
introducing statements of defendant mode to investigating
officers, the prosecution has the burden of showing that defendant, before making the statements, was either informed
of his rights to counEel and to I'email! l'i1pnt or otherwise
waived them.
{5] Id.-Conduct of Counsel-Comment on Failure of Defenda.nt
to Testify: Instructions-Failure of Defendant to Testify.A comment in the prosecutor's argument or the court's instructions on defendant's failure to testify violates U.S. Const .•
5th Amend., as made applicahle to the states by the 14th
Amend.
[6] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Misconduct of ProsecutorComment on Failure of Defendant to Testify.-The probability
of a result more favorable to defendant required rever~al for
the prosecutor's comment on defendants' failure to testify anrl
the erroneom; introduction of their statements where, except
for defendants' admissions to 0 witness who had 0 motive to
direct suspicion away from himself, tht' evidence was almost
wholly circumstantial and the prosecutor repeatedly stressed
defendant's lies as evidence of his consciousness of guilt that
destroyed any innocent interpretation that lIlight ue placed 011
other evidence.

APPEALS (one automatically taken uuder Pen. Code,
§ 1239, subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of
H,e City and County of San Francisco and from an order
granting a new trial. Norman Elkington, Judge. Judgment
reversed; order affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of first
degree murder imposing the death penalty reversed.
Nancy A. Rossi, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General,
Albert W. Harris, Jr., and Edward P. 0 'Brien, DE'puty Attorneys Geniral, for Plaintiff and Appellant and Plaintiff
and Respondent.
[5] Comment by court suggesting that jury may take into COIlsideration failure of accused person to testify, note, 94 A.L.R. 701;
constitutional or statutory provision permitting comment on failure
. of accused to testify on his own behalf as violotion of constitutional
. privilege against self-incrimination, nott', 104 A.L.R. 478. See olso
Oal.Jur.2d, Trial, §§ 436, 483; Am.Jur., Triol (1st ed §§ 470, 694) .
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John A.. Ertola, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C.J.-A jury found the defendants guilty of
first degree murder and fixed the penalty at death for Daniel
Allen Roberts and life imprisonment for Mae Blanche Coleman. The trial court denied Roberts' motion for new trial
but granted Mrs. Coleman's motion on the ground that involuntary statements were admitted in evidence against her.
The People's appeal from the order granting Mrs. Coleman
a new trial has been consolidated with Roberts' automatic
appeal. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
Mr. and Mrs. Luther Popejoy managed the apartment house
in which they lived in San Francisco. At approximately 10
p.m. on June 20, 1962, Popejoy left the building to go to his
job at a steel plant. When he returned the next morning he
found his wife dead under a bed in their bedroom. She had
been strangled, possibly with an electrical extension cord,
after having suffered a blow on the nose. The time of death
was sometime between 10 :30 p.m. on June 20, when she was
last seen alive, and 2 :30 the following morning. There was
testimony that it would have required considerable strength
for one person to place the body under the bed. A man's
watch, the victim's purse, a pair of red shoes with small
steel heels, the rental agreements between the Popejoys and
their tenants, and a rent receipt book were missing. There
was no evidence that the apartment had been entered forcibly.
Defendants had lived in the apartment house as man and
wife for several months. Popejoy testified that on his way to
work on the night of the killing he saw them sitting on the
front steps of the building. Another tenant testified that he
met defendant Roberts in the cellar of the building at approximately 10 :30 p.m. that night. Roberts offered him several
dozen books of matches, which he was throwing away because
he was "cleaning up." Roberts and the witness walked out
of the cellar together and separated in front of the victim's
door when Roberts said he intended to pay his rent. As the
witness walked upstairs Roberts knocked on the door. The
victim called, "'VIlat do you want at this time of nighU"
and Roberts said that he wished to pay the rent. The witness
saw the victim open her door and Roberts enter the apartment.
The police found Roberts' palmprint on the arm of a chair
in the Popejoy apartment and his fingerprint near the bottom of the door between the living room and bedroom. In
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the defendants' apartment the police found a radio, two
pairs of men's pants, and a note addressed to Roberts signed
by Mrs. Coleman stating that she planned to leave him to go
to Santa Barbara because he was being unfaithful to her.
The card on the defendants' mailbox near the front door of
the building with Roberts' name on it was missing.
Charles Roberts, defendant Roberts' brother, was the chief
prosecution witness. He testified that he visited the defendants on June 20 at approximately 6 p.m. Defendant Roberts
said that he planned to hold up a garment factory at 10 p.m.
that evening. Charles agreed to take some of defendants'
clothing to his home, and he left with the clothes by a side
door at Roberts' direction to avoid being seen by the Popejoys. Charles next saw the defendants when they arrived
at his home at approximately 2 :30 a.m. on June 21. Roberts
then told Charles, "I think I hit her too hard," and in response to Charles' question, "hit who too hard Y" Roberts
answered, "my landlady." Roberts said that his landlady
was under or by the bed. Mrs. Coleman was not present
during this conversation. Charles agreed to drive the defendants to Sacramento. On the way Mrs. Coleman said that she
had searched the Popejoy apartment and indicated that she
had been present when Roberts killed the victim. Mrs. Coleman said she thought it would be best if the victim were
dead so that they could not be identified. When they arrived
in Sacramento Roberts had Charles pawn a watch that was
identified at the trial as the one taken from the Popejoy
apartment. They then went to the American River and threw
in an electrical cord and a blue purse, ,vhich Roberts indicated- had come from the Popejoy apartment. Mrs. Coleman
told Charles that she had left a note in their apartment
designed to mislead the police.
Charles' wife testified that the defendants' clothes were
in Charles' automobile on the evening of June 20, that when
the defendants arrived at her apartment after midnight that
night Mrs. Coleman gave her a pair of black shoes with laces
and large wedge heels, and that the defendants left with
Charles. When Charles returned the following day he showed
her a newspaper story about the killing. He also disposed
of the shoes Mrs. Coleman had given her.
In early October 1962 an inspector from the San Francisco
Police Department and a San Francisco Assistant District
Attorney, armed with warrants for the defendants' arrest
for murder, went to Oregon where defendants were being held
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on another criminal charge. By that time the police had
gathered most of the evidence recited above. The investigators
questioned both defendants, and parts of tape recordings of
the interrogations were played for the jury.
Roberts told the investigators that he and Mrs. Coleman
left the Popejoy apartment house sometime around the middle
of June at approximately midnigllt or 1 a.m. They did not
tell Mr. or Mrs. Popejoy that they were leaving. They left
because Roberts had no job and had only $17. They hitchhiked
to Marysville and then to Oroville, where they caught a freight
train to Oregon. Roberts stated that he had not seen Mrs.
Popejoy on the day he left San Francisco but that he saw
Mr. Popejoy at about 9 p.m. when he and Mrs. Coleman
were sitting on the outside steps and Mr. Popejoy left to go
to work. He had not been in the Popejoys' apartment on
that day and had not been in it since the last time he paid
the rent, which he always paid in the daytime and never
at night. He had never attempted to pay the rent at night
and had never been anywhere near the Popejoy door after
Mr. Popejoy had gone to work. He had only been inside the
Popejoy apartment at the desk and had never at any time
been in the bedroom.
In a separate interview, Mrs. Coleman first told the investigators that she had been living with Roberts for about three
months at the Popejoy apartment house before they left
San Francisco sometime after June 25. They left at about
3 :30 or 4 a.m., hitchhiked to Marysville, and then took a
freight train to Oregon. They left because Roberts had violated his parole and they had seen his parole officer· in San
Francisco. She had not been in the Popejoy apartment the
evening before they left. After they saw Mr. Popejoy on
his way to work, they went to their apartment where they
remained until 2 or 3 a.m. when they left San Francisco.
When the investigators told Mrs. Coleman that they had
talked to Roberts' brother Charles and knew how she and
Roberts left San Francisco, she admitted that she and Roberts
llad gone to Charles' apartment at about 3 or 4 a.m. and
asked him for a ride to Sacramento. In the morning Charles
pawned It guitar and Roberts pawned his watch. She did not
see Mrs. Popejoy the evening before and neither she nor
Roberts attempted to pay. the rent that night. She admitted
writing the note left in the kitchen but claimed that she
wrote it to make Roberts leave San Francisco. She wrote
it about 2 a.m. when Roberts was in the Fillmore district for
about two hours. When asked if she had ever seen a pair of
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Mrs. Popejoy's shoes, she said that Mrs. Popejoy had given
her a pair of black shoes but that she could not remember
what she had done with them.
Neither defendant testified at the trial.
Because of the introduction into evidence of defendants'
statements and comment by the court and prosecutor on
defendants' failure to testify, we requested briefs directed
to the question whether the recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [84
S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653], and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], were applicable
to this case. In the Escobedo case it was held that "where
... [a crim.inal] investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody. the
police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself
to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory
upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 342 [372 U.S. 335 (83 S.Ct. 792,
9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733)], and that no statement
elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used
against him at a criminal trial." (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 490491 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977].)
[la] Conceding that the investigation into Mrs. Popejoy's
murder had focused on defendants, that they were in police
custody, that the interrogations by the investigators lent
themselves to eliciting incriminating statements, and that
incriminating statements were elicited and used against them
at the trial, the Attorney General contends that the Escobedo case is not controlling because there was no objection
to the introduction of the statements into evidence and there
is no showing that defendants were not advised of their right
to remain silent and no showing that either of them requested
and was denied the assistance of counsel.
[2] Since this case was tried before the Escobedo decision, defendants' failure to object to the admission of their
statements into evidence does not preclude their raising the
question Oll appeal. (Pl'ople v. Hillery, 62 C'a1.2d 6!l2. 711
[44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382], and cases cited.) [3] The
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right to counsel during interrogation does not turn on a
request (People v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338, 347 [42 Cal.Rptr.
169, 398 P.2d 361]), and a waiver of that right and of the
right to remain silent cannot be presumed. [4] The burden
is therefore on the prosecution to show that a defendant was
either informed of these rights or otherwise waived them. 1
(People v. Stewart, 62 Ca1.2d 571, 580-581 [43 Cal.Rptr.
201, 400 P.2d 97]; People v. Hillery, 62 Ca1.2d 692,
711-712 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382]; People Y. LiZliock, 62 Ca1.2d 618, 621 [43 CaLRptr. 699, 401 P.2d
4].) [ib] Accordingly, whether or not the trial court
erred in holding that Mrs. Coleman's statements were involuntary, it did not err in granting her motion for a new trial.
Since Roberts did not confess to the investigators but only
made false exculpatory statements and since the jury was
instructed that Mrs. Coleman's statements should be considered only against her, it is contended that the error in
admitting their statements into evidence was not prejudicial
to Roberts. (See People v. Parham, 60 CaL2d 378, 385-386
[33 Cal.Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001] ; cf. People v. Dorado, 62
Ca1.2d 338, 356-357 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169,398 P.2d 361].) This
error cannot be considered alone, however, for the court and
prosecutor also erred in commenting on defendants' failure
to testify. [5] It is now settled that such comment violates
the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [85 S.Ct. 1229, 14
L.Ed.2d 106] ; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [84 S.Ct.
1758.12 L.Ed.2d 653).)
[6] Except for Charles' testimony of defendants' oral
admissions to him, the evidence was almost wholly circumstantiaL It was the defense theory that the circumstances
were consistent with innocence, or at most second degree
murder, and that as a possible participant in the crime,
Charles ""as unworthy of belief. Charles was familiar with
the Popejoy apartment house, said he was there on the evening of June 20, and knew that defendants were planning
IThe record affirmatively shows that defendant Roberts requested
counsel and did not wuh'e his rights. The tape recording of his interview with the investigators began before they introduced themselves to
him and cQntinued until the enel. of tIle questioning. At no time did they
inform Roberts of his rights. ~Ioreover. he repeatedly stated to the investigators that he wished to answer questions only in the presence of an
attorney. Despite these protests. the investigators persisted in questioning
him and succeeded in eliciting statements that were used against him at
the trial.
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to leave town. He pawned Mr. Popejoy's watch and threw
the other things allegedly taken from the apartment into the
river. He at first denied any knowledge of the crime, and
only implicated defendants after the police learned that he
had pawned the watch. Thus, Charles had an obvious interest in directing suspicion away from himself. Roberts'
entry into Mrs. Popejoy's apartment in full view of another
tenant was not consistent with a preexisting plan to rob or
kill, and the jury might well have entertained at least a reasonable doubt whether Roberts was guilty of first degree
murder had the prosecution not been allowed to prove that
both he and Mrs. Coleman lied to the police and had the
court and prosecutor not commented on their failure to testify.
In his argument to the jury the prosecutor repeatedly
stressed defendants' lies 2 as evidence of consciousness of
guilt that destroyed any innocent interpretation that might
be placed upon the other evidence, and he asserted that the
lies were part of a prearranged plan of Roberts and Mrs.
Coleman to mislead the police.
Moreover, the inadmissible statements were not merely repetitions of similar admissible statements. Accordingly, it cannot be determined what impact their erroneous admission
may have had on Roberts' decision not to testify. The prose2For example: "Well, we know that ultimately both of these defendants were captured in Oregon. We know that, don't we' And at
that time the frame of mind of Daniel Roberts, I suppose, should
have been, 'Well, I am caught. My parole has been violated. O.K. I
give up now. That is it.'
"And if you asked him then . . . 'Well, how did you get away
that night,' he could have said easily, 'Well, I went out to Charles
and he drove me to Sacramento.' Or he could have said, 'Well, we
went to Sacramento.'
" 'Did you go to see Mrs. Popejoy that night!' He could have easily
said, 'Well, yes, I did. I did, yes.'
" 'Did you see Charles that nightT' He should have replied, 'Well,
yes, I saw Charles that night.'
"Instead. what did he sayi Here is a man that tries to tell you that
he has nothing to do with this murder, that the only reason that he
fied was his violation of parole. In effect, he should be in a position
of saying, 'Well, there is nothing more to lie about now. I am
caught. My parole has been violated. You have me now. There is
no reason to lie.' And yet be does. He lies about his prints. He lies
about going'to Marysville. He lies about seeing Charles that night.
He lies nbout being ncar her apartment thnt night or going in her
apartment that night. He lies ahout seeing her thnt night. And the
question comes into your mind, 'Why"
"Here is II mlln who hns nothing to rUIl from any mort'. His parole
is violated. He is captured. And he lies once, twice, three times, and
lies some more. And the question comes up, 'Well, what is this man
lying for! Whnt forf What does he know' What is he trying to
eonceal" "

92

PEOPLE

I'.

ROBER1'S

, r63 C.2d

cutor took full advantage of that decision by forcefully commenting on it in his argument,3 as he then reasonably assumed
he was entitled to do. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; People v.
Adamson,27 Cal.2d 478 [165 P.2d 3] ; Adamson v, California,
332 U.S. 46 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R.
1223],) With evidence before the jury that he had repeatedly
lied to the police, Roberts and his trial counsel may have
concluded that it would be futile for Roberts to attempt to
eXCUlpate himself by testifying to other eXCUlpatory facts
even if they were true. Had he not been deprived of his right
to counsel during interrogation, he might have been advised
to say nothing or to tell the truth if he was innocent or
guilty of only second degree murder, even though the truth
might have appeared to him as less exculpatory than false
3For example: "So they ask you, 'Disbelieve Charles,' they say
to you, 'Disbelieve him.' They don't take the stand under oath and
tell you he lied. These are the people who could tell you that he lied,
if he .did so. They do not do so. They ask you to disbelieve because he
made some inconsistencies. . , •
"Shouldn't you say, 'At least, if I am asked as a logical person
to reject his testimony, I should have liked to have heard the testimony
of one of those two defendants or both; I should have liked to have at
least have heard them say one thing, "I didn't kill Mrs. Popejoy." ,
"I should think yoU might want to hear perhaps a little more and
say something about, 'I didn't throw a cord in thc river.' But, no, you
are not accorded that privilege, and the defendants need not take the
stand. I don't mean to conclude, ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
for one moment that they need to take the stalid, or that they should,
or that you should conclude just even for a moment that they are
guilty by not taking the stand, because, thank God, in America no
one need get up . • . there and hang himself, and I, for one, believe
in this law. The prosecutor must prove his case to you beyond a
reasonable doubt, and this is good law and this is what I am trying
to do. I don't think we should have to rely on their testimony to
convict them, and the law promises this, and I agree to it.
"But they sit here with so much knowledge within their grasp
and deny you that; you can conclude that, in fact, Charles Roberts
and these other witnesses like McKinley Brown, in fact, did tell the
truth. You can at least logically do this . • . .
" . • . [Counsel for Roberts) says, after all, he says, my client,
you know, has been convicted of a felony and if he took the stand,
you wouldn't believe him anyway, because he would stand impeached.
"What sort of an explanation is thaH What sort of a substitution
is that for offering you at least evidence, for having at least this
much come from the mouth of the defendant • • . Daniel Roberts,
under oath'
"One, the motive for Charles to lie; two, to tell you he didn't kill
:!IIrs. Popejoy, under oath, 'I didn't kill Mrs. Popejoy.' Three, 'I was
with Dora.' And who is Dora; and how can she be located' If he just
said this, but he didn't say anything like that. I want to bring it
very clearly forward to you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that
you are not to imply if a defendant, a man who doesn't take the
stand, he is guilty. But a man who doesn't take the stand to testify,
I suppose, to at least this e%tent, does not dispute the facts that have
been presented by the prosecution. • • ."
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denials of any incriminating facts. He was induced at a
critical stage in the proceedings to make choices that he
could make intelligently only with the advice of counsel.
(Escobedo v. Illinoig, 378 U.S. 478, 486 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12
L.Ed.2d 977]; see Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55
[82 s.et. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114]; White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59, 60 [83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 hEd.2d 193]; Glasset· v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 7;:5-76 [62 S.Ct. 467, 86 L.Ed. 680];
Williams v. Kaiser, 32:3 V.S. 471, 475-476 [65 S.Ct. 363,
89 L.Ed. 398 J ; cf. People v. Gaines, 58 Ca1.2d 630, 644 [25
Cal.Rptr. 448, 375 P.2d 296] [dissenting opinion].)
After reviewing the entire record in the light of all the
foregoing consideratiolls, we are of the opinion that it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Roberts
would have been reached had defendants' statements not
been erroneously admitted into evidence and had the court
and prosecutor not commented on their failure to testify. Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed. (See Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 4%; People v. Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299
P.2d 243]; People v. Bostick, 62 Ca1.2d 820, 823-826 [44
Cal.Rptr. 649, 402 P.2d '529].)
The reversal of Roberts' conviction is compelled by the
Griffin case and by the Escobedo case regardless of whether
a request for counsel during interrogation is controlling.
Roberts repeatedly stated to the investigators that he wished
to answer questions only in the presence of an attorney. Despite these protests, the investigators persisted in questioning
him and succeeded in eliciting statements that were introduced
into evidence against him. The prosecutor vigorously urged
in argument that those statements and Roberts' failure to
testify destroyed his defense.
The trial court granted Mrs. Coleman's motion for a new
trial on the ground that her statements were involuntary
and clearly prejudciaI. Since her statements are also inadmissible under the rules set forth in the People v. Dorado,
62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], People v.
Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571 [43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97].
People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d
382], anti People v. Lilliock, 62 Ca1.2d 618 [43 Cal.Rptr.
699, 401 P.2d 4], and since the court and prosecutor
also erred in commenting on her failure to testify. we need
not and have not determined whether the trial court correctly
ruled that her statements were involuntary. The reasons
!lOd authorities set forth at length after the hearing and re-
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hearing in People v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr.
169, 398 P.2d 361], compelled this court, as they have other
courts, 4 in being faithful to the Constitution of the United
States as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
to hold that the rule of the Escobedo case does not depend
upon a request for counsel.
The order granting defendant Coleman a new trial is
affirmed. The judgment is reversed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Dooling, J.,. concurrl:'d.

/~)
...._--

SCHAUER,J.,· Concurring and Dissenting.-In this case
each defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court denied
the motion of defendant Roberts but granted that of defendant
Coleman.
Because of those attributes of our judicial system which
are indigenous to the trial process (and which are adumbrated
in my dissent in People v. Davis (1965) 62 Cal.2d 791, 801802 [44 Cal.Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142]) I recognize that the
trial judge is in a position far superior to a justice of this
court in resolving factual issues. These issues encompass the
pivotal one as to the existence or nonexistence of the constitutionally defined basis without which the court is peremptorily
forbidden to grant a new trial (or, on appeal, to reverse a
judgment).
By "constitutionally defined basis" I refer to that articulated by California Constitution, article VI, section 4%,1 interpreted in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836
[12] [299 P.2d 243]. It is, of course, true that the subject
section of the Constitution "should control the action of the
trial court in considering a motion· for a new trial, but when
the trial court has . . . granted the motion, the sole issue be40lifton v. United States, 341 F.2d 649, 653; United States ex reI.
Russo v. New Jersey, 331 F.2d 429; Galarza Oruz v. Delgado, 233 F.
Supp. 94!; United States ex reI. Rivers v. MyerSj 2!O F.Supp. 39, 43;
State v. Dufour, - - R.I. - - [206 A.2d 82, 85 ; State v. Neely. 239
Ore. 487 [398 P.2d 482].
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

.

l"Sec. 4%. No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in
any case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter
of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after
an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court
8hall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice."
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fore the appellate court is whether the trial court has abused
its discretion." (Brandclius v. City"" County of San Francisco (1957) 47 Ca1.2d 729, 744 [18] [306 P.2d 432].)
I do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion of defendant Roberts. Furthermore, assuming (only for the purposes of this dissenting and concurring opinion) the errors declared by the majority, I am
not of the view (in the light of the entire record) that a result
more favorable to defendant Roberts would have been reached
in the absence of those errors. .Accordingly, I dissent from
the majority's reversal of, and would affirm, the judgment
against Roberts. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4Y2; People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818, 835-836 [12] [299 P.2d 243].)
In respect to defendant Coleman, from my disadvantageous
position factwise, I cannot validly conclude that the trial
court as a matter of law abused its discretion in granting her
motion for a new trial. Accordingly, I concur with the majority in affirming that order.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the order granting defendant Coleman a new trial and would affirm the
judgment of first degree murder fixing the penalty at death as
.
to defendant Roberts.
After an examination of the record, I am not of the opinion
that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
defendants would have been reached in the absence of the
errors complained of. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4112; see concurring and dissenting opinions in In re Shipp, 62 Ca1.2d
547 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571], People v. Modesto, 62
Ca1.2d 436, 464 [42 Cal.Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753], and
People v. Hines, 61 Ca1.2d 164, 175, 183 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622,
390 P.2d 398] ; and dissenting opinions in People v. Domdo,
62 Ca1.2d 338, 361-364 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361].)
My views 011 the legal principles involved in cases such as
this are accurately and realistically expressed by l\Ir. J llstice
Fourt in his dissenting opinion in People v. Benat'idez, 233
Cal.App.2d 303, 307 et seq. [43 Cal.Rptr. 577], filed on
March 30, 1965.
The defendant in that case was Mnvieted in 1959 of first
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment; his COllviction was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, and tllis
court unanimously denied a hearing. In April 1964. abont a
year after Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 [83 8.et. 814,
9 L.Ed.2d 811], was decided, the District Court of Appeal
was compelled to vacate its judgment because the defendant
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had not been represented by coullSel on appeal. Counsel was
then appointed, the appellate court again reviewed the record,
and affirmed the judgment for the second time .
.After Escobedo, we granted the defendant's petition for a
hearing and retransferred the case to the District Court of
.Appeal for reconsideration in light of that decision.
Upon reviewing the case for the third time, two members
of thc three-member District Court of Appeal felt compelled,
six years after conviction, to reverse on the authority of
Escobedo and this court's decision in People v. Dorado, 62
Ca1.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], in spite of the
fact that the dE'fendant had volunt.arily confessed to having
committed a cold-blooded murder in the perpetration of robbery and had had the advantage of every legal resource.
'While the long lJistory of review of the Benavidez conviction
makes a reversal more appalling than in the present case,
Justice Fourt analyzes the problems faced by law enforcement
officers when appellate courts, with apparent indi.fference to
the rights of law-abiding citizens, move the rules of formal
court procedure back to the police station and reverse convictions where there has been no miscarriage of justice. His
dissent is quoted, in part:
" ... In effect, a policeman, under the rule set forth [Dorado
rule J, when he thinks he has a prime suspect in custody must
proceed to arraign the suspect for further questioning-and if
the policeman does not so properly arraign the suspect, even
a full, complete and voluntary confession of the suspect made
within two minutes thereafter is not admissible at the trial.
And this is done apparently, (not to protect an innocent person) but to punish the police for a failure to perform their
duty-but the net result is that a dangerous criminal is turned
loose onto society and decent people are at the mercy of that
dangerous criminal until he is caught in some other crime of
violence.
"A Pandora's box of confusion, uncertainty, disarray and
discord is unleashed by such a decree. For example, the law
books are fun of cases where committing judges, trial judges
and others llave proceeded in cases with the understanding of
all concerned that there was. a sufficient, proper and legal
waiyer of some particular right by a defendant (such as a
public trial, jury trial, delay in trial, delay in pronouncing
judlrment, appointment of counsE'l, jury cllallenge, etc.) and
which later have been reversed by an appellate court because
some justice thought that the judge of the lower court had misinterpreted the evidence of waiver. Can anyone imagine how
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many criminals in the future will swear (even though an
officer has fully complied with the law of Dorado) to the effect
that they did not really understand that they were waiving
any rights, that they did not hear what the policemen had to
say, that they were emotionally disturbed at the time and did
not really mean to waive any rights. Furthermore, it can
easily be seen in the light of the fact that no workable rule is
or can be laid down as to what constitutes a proper waiver and
as a consequence every police officer necessarily will be practically on his own. In other words, the court says, in effect,
that it will nullify the policeman's efforts and the results
obtained therefrom if he does not meet the standards of the
court, but the court refuses to tell the policeman in advance
what the standards are. Could anyone design a better formula
for handcuffing the police? Query: does the suspect have to
make a declaration of waiver, or can he impliedly waive YWhat
is the standard a policeman is to use in coming to a conclusion
as to whether a suspect has intelligently and understandably
waived his rights to keep still-keeping in mind, of course,
that the waiver must depend upon the particular facts and
circumstances of each case, including the background, experience and conduct of the suspect?
"Heretofore the courts have thought that 'the serious and
weighty responsibility' of making a determination as to whether
there was a waiver of a substantial right was lodged in the
trial judge. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 [58 S.Ct.
1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357].) Now, apparently, the
policeman is supposed to make the determination as to whether
and when the suspect makes an intelligent and knowledgeable
waiver. The simple stating of tlle proposition makes it clear
that the successful interrogation of suspects will be next to
impossible under any such rule.
"The Supreme Court of the United States has in the past
ruled to the effect that there was no constitutional right of a
suspect to be advised of his right to counselor of his right to
remain silent. (Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 [83 S.Ct.
1336, 10 L.Erl.2d 513]; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
[78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448] ; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S.
504 [78 S.Ct. 1297, 2 hEd.2d 1523].) Likewise, our Supreme
Court has heretofore similarly held in People v. Ditson, 57
Ca1.2d 415 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165,369 P.2d 714] ; People v. Garner,
57 Ca1.2d 135 [18 Cal.Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680]; People v.
Kendrick, 56 Ca1.2d 71 [14 Ca1.Rptr. 13, 363 P.2d 13] ; and
People v. Crooker, 47 Ca1.2d 348 [303 P.2d 753] .
•
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"Under Dorado policemen who ordinarily are not required
to be learned and skilled in constitutional law now have the
burden of advising suspects of their constitutional rights, and
they must do so at just the right moment in the proceedings,
otherwise the probabilities are extremely great that a selfconfessed violent criminal will be turned loose. It appears that
any court, at the very least, should look at the totality of the
circumstances in the police procedure to determine whether
there was fundamental fairness; even under those circumstances there would be no well-defined guide lines for a policeman to follow. There should never be a situation, however,
where a coldblooded, robbing, murderer in the face of a
mountain of conclusive evidence against him may be released
into society solely because the police failed to comply with
a rule which was nonexistent at the time of the investigation
and the trial-and particularly so where the reversal is not
upon the theory that possibly the defendant is innocent.
" A hearing before a judicial officer in a judicial proceeding
is one thing-a police investigation is something else. The ru1es
of evidence should, of course, prevail in the judicial proceeding, but certainly not in the police interrogation process. The
next step might well be to promUlgate a rule to the effect that
the police cannot consider hearsay evidence in their investigations. Query: what occurs in the event a suspect asks for a
named attorney and the police secure that named attorney for
the defendant and the suspect later claims that the attorney
was ineffective, and, therefore, was no attorney at aU-is the
free and voluntary confession of the suspect made after he had
talked to the named attorney to be admitted or rejected because counsel was supposedly ineffective? Is there to be a
presumption that any suspect who confesses after seeing his
attorney has an ineffective attorney?
"Assume that a crime has been committed, and the police
arrest a prime suspect and have him in custody and the suspect wants to talk to his attorney A (who has represented
him in several other criminal trials) but A is out of the
country on a vacation at the time and will not be back for 30
days-->.what do the police do-is the investigation at a standstill and stalemate--and if the suspect confesses in the meantime and before the attorney returns, is the confession admissible into evidence T
"The police, as I understand it, are representatives of the
executive arm of the government-there to enforce the law
as written, to protect and to serve the community. Why should
an officer be insulated from talking to a suspect T There seems
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to be expressed in both Escobedo and Dorado a veiled distrust
of the police. As heretofore indicated, police are but the
representatives of the public and the presumption is that they
perform their duties faithfully and well, and the records bear
out the fact that they do their jobs extremly well considering
the judge-made hurdles which have been put into their paths.
The fact that police work is not performed in public view
should be of no particular consequence, for by the nature of
things, it has to be so conducted-the work of the police is to
ferret out crime and to keep the community a safe place for
its residents. It may be distasteful to have police at all or
to have them investigating and questioning-on the other hand,
it is more distasteful to be unable to walk on an ordinary
street in a city without fear of violence being committed to
your person or property. If people committed no crime, there
would be little need for policemen. But be that as it may, the
judicial attitude of this state seems entirely unrealistic as to
conditions as they exist insofar as the police are concerned.
"In Dorado the court waves aside any forebodings of law
enforcement officials as to the effect of its ruling. The court
cites as authority, in part, for its position a statement in an
article by J. Edgar Hoover in a 1951-1952 Iowa Law Review
(p. 182) where Hoover said:
" 'Agents are taught that any suspect or arrested person,
at the outset of an interview, must be advised that he is not
required to make a statement and that any statement given
can be used against him in court. Moreover, the individual
must be informed that, if he desires, he may obtain the services
of an attorney of his own choice. Duress or brutality of any
type is absolutely forbidden. Any Special Agent guilty of
such conduct is subject to immediate dismissal from the
service. The highest ethics of law enforcement become part
of the Special Agent's credo. Nothing less can be accepted.'
"Hoover also pointed out in that article that the F.B.I.
is not a police force-it is the investigative arm of the Department of Justice, is strictly a fact-finding agency. It does not
authorize tJr decline prosecution or make recommendations or
evaluations.
"In any event, if J. Edgar Hoover is to be used as an authority (and I assuredly believe he should be) then it is appropriate to have something of his of more recent date. In a speech at
St. Ignatius Loyola University on November 24, 1964, and reported in the Congressional Record February 8, 1965, he said,
among other things:
" 'The moment has arrived when we must face realistically
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the startling fact tbat since 1958 crime in tbis country bas
increased five times faster than our population growth. Serious crimes-murder, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, automobile theft-have mounted steadily since
the end of World War II. In 1951 these crimes for the first
time topped tbe 1 million mark, and more than 21,4 million
serious crimes were reported during 1963.
" 'Even more ominous is the fact that this terrifying spiral
in crime bas come about througb a growing wave of youthful
criminality across tbe Nation. Last year for the 15th consecutive year crimes involving our young people increased over the
previous year. For all serious crimes committed in the United
States in 1963, youthful offenders were responsible for a staggering 72 percent of the total arrests for these crimes.
" 'What a grim and unhappy commentary on the moral
climate of this great Nation. Tbe moral strength of our Nation
has decreased alarmingly. . . .
" 'These shocking statistics together with the public's apparent indifference to them are indicative of the false morality
we are tolerating today....
" 'Law and order are the foundations upon which successful
government must stand. Without law and order, society will
d.estroy itself.
" 'We must never forget that government cannot favor one
group or one special interest over its duty to protect the rights
of all citizens. We must constantly guard government against
the pressure groups wbich would crush the rights of others
under heel in order to achieve their own ends.
" 'The law of the land is above any individual. All must
abide by it. If we short cut the law, we playa dangerous game
which can only resuZt in totaZ defeat for all of us because if
we destroy our system of government by law, we destroy our
only means of achieving a stable society . ...
" , Justice has nothing to do with expediency. It has nothing
to do with temporary standards . . . .
" 'Unfortunately and too often humanity, if left to itself,
moyes along the line of least resistance. That is the reason wc
make such slow progress, and why we are prone to wait for
pathfinders to blaze the way for us to follow. Each of us hopes
that beyond the despair and darkness of today there is something better in store for tomorrow. It will be tragic if nothing
but hope is b·rought to bear on the problem of crime ill the'
United States today . ...
" ' ... If we are to reverse the crime picture in this country,
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we must makc a sustained effort to stir the complacent ones
to awareness.
" 'lVe mollycoddle young criminals and release unreformed
hoodlums to prey anew on society. The blceding hcarts, particularly among the judiciary, m'e so concerned for young
criminals that they become indifferent to thc rights of lawabiding citizens.
" '"\Ve must have judges with courage and a high sense of
their duty to protect the public and to adequately penalize
criminals if we are to stop the spread of serious and dangerous
crimes against society.
" , We must adopt a most realistic attitude toward this critical problem. We have tried the lenient approach and it has
failed.' (Italics added.)
"Furthermore, if it is to be inferred from Dorado that the
rule enunciated there works well in the federal system, I can
only think that the one area where they 11 ave the federal system
exclusively, namely, Washington, D.C., does not commend
itself to California. The statistics show, without question, that
Washington, D.C. has more aggravated assaults than any city
of corresponding size in. the United States, where armed
marauders prowl the streets at night, where no sensible woman
dares walk at nighttime-where an atmospllere of lawlessness
even pervades the public schools. And a look at the crime
statistics of this area (California) will indicate that ever since
the courts apparently have embraced the philosophy of superior rights for inferiors or criminals, the law-abiding public
has suffered drastically.
"The rights of those accused of crimes should not be paramount and superior to the rights of the decent law-abiding
citizens of the community. It is to engage in nothing short of
duplicity to say that the rule of Dorado will not seriously hamper effective law enforcement in California-and the penalty
in effect, as I have heretofore indicated, is visited upon the
public.
"The police have the right and duty to conduct reasonable
interrogations of persons charged with crime-it is a duty they
will have, regardless of Supreme Court decisions, and it is
totally unrealistic and manifestly unfair and dangerous to
expound rules of conduct or procedure to which the police
cannot possibly strictly adhere while at the same time performing their duties and fulfilling their responsibilities as
expected of them by the decent people of the community.
"This business of grasping at anything to support a reversal
in a criminal case (the search for error) has gotten to the point
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of absurdity where justice is perverted and respect for the
administration of justice is nil.
"If any support is needed for that assertion, I only point
to the general disrespect for authority and specifically to the
disrespect for the law enforcement officer who is repeatedly
assaulted while acting in the line of duty.
"I refuse to join in what I think is a most unfortunate
trend of judicial decisions which strain to give the guilty not
the same but vastly more protection than the law-abiding citizen receives.
"Furthermore, contrary to the rule of Dorado, the appellate
courts of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Ohio, Maryland,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York and New Jersey have held in
effect that the rule of Escobedo is as the Supreme Court of
the United States stated it, namely that the refusal of a suspect's reqttest for counsel is an indispensable condition of the
new constitutional rule.
"Admittedly, this so-called newly discovered constitutional
right uncovered in Dorado is something which no other court
in the past 150 years has ever before found. It seems to me
that rights which reach constitutional magnitude in 1965 surely
must have been of some significance or size sometime during
the last 100 years at least to the extent that one appellate
court in the land would have observed such a right and so
declared it. There is no such opinion in the books which I
ean find. I am unwilling to attribute to all of the appellate
justices of all of the appellate courts of the United States
in the past 150 years such blindness.
"If the thought is that free and voluntary confessions
should no longer be used or available to the prosecution in the
trial of cases, it would be far better to so announce in so
many words and have done with it. The use of confessions
should not, however, by any whittling down process be put out
of existence on the installment plan-in other words, the use
of confessions should not meet the fate the death penalty has
met.
"An investigation of criminal activity and the trial of a
suspect should ee a search for the truth, with all competent and
relevant evidence admitted before the trier of fact to the end
that justice might prevail and the public be protected. Nothing could be worse than to have no fixed doctrine in the decisions and no precise guidelines for those whose duty it is to
enforce the law.
"It is an old saying that every criminal ought to have his
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day in court, and he certainly should have it, but it is nothing
short of ridiculous for the appellant in this case, having had
his many, many days in court to be turned loose now, not because there is even a remote possibility of his innocence, but
to teach the police. a lesson.
"How refreshing it would seem, and how greatly enhanced
the respect for the administration of justice, if appellate courts
would not roam at will in the limitless area of personal beliefs
and philosophy, but would make their decrees under the plain
language of the Constitution."
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